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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
000O000-— 
Civil No. 14117 
ELNA A. SHUPE, and • 
YAVETTE SIIUPE, by 
and through her Guardian 
ad Litem, ELNA A. SIIUPE, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
- vc -
WASATCH ELECTRIC COMPANY, : 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
and ESCO CORPORATION, an : .; 
Oregon corporation, 
DefOxidants and 
Respondents. : 
, 000O000 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, WASATCH ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC, 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The Respondent agrees with the Statement of the Kind of 
Case as set forth in the Appellants1 Brief. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Respondent agrees with the statement of the Appellants 
with regard to the disposition in the lower Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent seeks to have the Judgment entered by 
the lower Court dismissing Appellants' Complaint affirmed in the 
entirety. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts set forth in the Brief of the 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE APPEL-
:
 LANTS1 COMPLAINT AND HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FAILED 
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE 
GRANTED BY VIRTUE OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
A. APPELLANTS1 DECEDENT WAS IN THE SAME 
EMPLOYMENT A3 THE RESPONDENT, WASATCH ELECT-
RIC COMPANY, AND APPELLANTS' SOLE REMEDY IS 
THEREFORE LIMITED TO COMPENSATION UNDER THE 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The Appellants' decedent was an employee of Christiansen 
Brothers, Inc., the general contractor on the Canyon Road Towers 
Condominium project, in Salt Lake City, Utah. At the time of the 
accident in question, the Respondent was a subcontractor of 
Christiansen Brothers, Inc. pursuant to a "subcontract Agreement" 
entered into on April 25, 1974, whereby the Respondent subcontracted 
with Christiansen Brothers, Inc. to design, furnish and install all 
electrical work on said project. (R 22-25) . The vital issue with 
which the Court is here confronted is whether the general contractor 
Christiansen Brothers, Inc., having engaged the Respondent as a 
subcontractor, retained sufficient supervision or control over the 
subcontractor such that all persons employed by the Respondent 
(subcontractor) should be deemed to be employees of such original 
employer (Christiansen Brothers, Inc.). 
The Appellants herein assert a cause of action under 
the provisions of Section 35-1-62 U.C.A. (1953, as amended) which 
provides, inter alia, that: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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When any injury or death for which compensation 
is payable under this title shall have been 
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another 
person not in the same employment, . . ., his 
heirs or personal representative may also have 
an action for damages against such third person, 
(emphasis added) 
This statute would, of course, give an additional cause 
of acti/^ to such persons over and above their claim for Workmen's 
Compensation under the laws of the State of Utah. 
In the case of Smith v. Brown, 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P. 2d 
994 (1972), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the principles which 
should be considered in applying the Workmen's Compensation Act to an 
analogous problem. These same considerations were again set forth 
in the case of Adaiuson v. Okland Construction Company, 29 Utah 2d 
286, 508 P. 2d 805 (1973). The Court reiterated in Adamson that: 
The purpose of the Act is to provide speedy and 
certain compensation for workmen and their de-
pendents and to avoid the delay, expense and un-
certainty which were involved prior to the Act; 
and the concomitant purpose of protecting the 
employer from the hazards of exorbitant and in 
some instances perhaps ruinous liability. Those 
principals are applicable here and correlated 
to them is the proposition that the act should 
be liberally construed and applied to provide 
coverage and effectuate those purposes. 
Fundamental standards of justice dictate that it 
would be inconsistent to apply the act liberally 
in favor of the injured workman in order to find 
coverage by one employer on a project, and then 
to reverse that policy and adopt a restrictive view 
to exclude coverage of another employer on the 
project so that a suit could be maintained against 
him. 
The specific provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act 
governing the situation here are set forth in Section 35-1-42 U.C.A. 
(1953, as amended) which provides, inter alia, that: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Where any employer procures any work to be 
done wholly or in part for him by a contractor 
over whose work he retains supervision or con-
trol, and such work is a part or process in 
the trade or business of the employer, such 
contractor, and all persons employed by him, 
and all subcontractors under him, and all per-
sons employed by any such subcontractors, 
shall be deemed, within the meaning of this 
Setion, employees of such original employer. 
Directing the Court's attention to Section 3 of the 
"Subcontract Agreement" in question here (R 23), it is provided, 
inter alia, that: 
The Subcontractor shall prosecute his work with 
due diligence so as> not to delay the work of 
the Contractor or other Subcontractors, and in 
the event that the Subcontractor neglects and/or 
fails to supply the necessary labor and/or materials, 
tools, implements, equipment, etc., in the opinion 
of the Contractor, then the Contractor shall notify 
the Subcontractor in writing setting forth the de-
ficiency and/or delinquency, and five days after 
date of such written notice, the Contractor shall 
have the right if he so desires to take over the 
work of the Subcontractor in full, and exclude the 
Subcontractor from any further participation in the 
work covered by this agreement; or, at his option, 
the Contractor may take over such portion of the 
Subcontractor's work as the Contractor shall deem 
to be in the best interest of the Contractor, and 
permit the Subcontractor to continue with the re-
maining portions of the work. 
It should be further noted that Section 13 of the "Subcontract 
Agreement" (R 25) allows the general contractor certain discretion 
with regard to the scheduling of the work to be performed by the 
Respondent and others performing work on the project. 
In Adamson, this Court was confronted with a very simi-
lar factual situation as that which now confronts the Court. The 
Plaintiff therein sued Oakland Construction for the wrongful death 
of Robert L. Adamson, who was electricuted while doing electrical 
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work in the construction of a hospital in Ogden, Utah. Oakland 
Construction Company, the general contractor, had entered into 
a subcontract with an electrical subcontractor, said subcontractor 
being the employer of the decedent. In referring to the provis-
ions of Section 35-1-42 U.C.A. (1953, as amended) this Court held 
that it did not seem open to any doubt that the work of the elect-
rical installation by the subcontractor was a part or process in 
the trade or business of the general contractor, that being the 
construction of the hospital. The vital question with which the 
Court waij concerned however, was whether the general contractor, 
having engaged a subcontractor, retained sufficient supervision and 
control over that subcontractor under the provision of the above 
referenced statute. The Court there held that the test to be 
applied is the "right to supervise and control, and not necessar-
ily the degree to which that right is in fact exercised". 
The contract with which the Court was concerned in 
Adamson provided that if, in the opinion of the general contractor, 
the work of the subcontractor did not proceed satisfactorily, then 
after appropriate notice, the general contractor has the right if 
he so desires to take over the work of the subcontractor in full. 
The general contractor in Adamson also had the right to direct 
the sequence of work by the subcontractors, to make changes in 
the work done by them, and the right to order work stoppages. 
These provisions are essentially identical to the powers of the 
general contractor, Christiansen Brothers, Inc., in the case now 
before the Court. 
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The Court, in Adamson, held that the lower Court was 
correct in rejecting the Plaintiffs' contention that Oakland 
was a wrongdoer not in the same employment as the decedent and 
in holding that the Workmen's Compensation was therefore Plain-
tiffs' exclusive remedy as against these employers. Summary 
Judgment of the lower Court was affirmed. 
The case which now confronts the Court is virtually i 
identical to the Adamson case. The Appellants have attempted to 
distinguish Adamson on the ground that the Appellants' decedent I 
was an eiaployee of its general contractor rather than an employee i 
of the subcontractor. However, under the reasoning of the Court 
in Adamson, as well as Smith, this distinction is totally unreason- I 
able and invalid. As the Appellants admit in their Brief, it must 
be kept in mind that the test to be applied in these situations is I 
the right of the general contractor to supervise and control the j 
subcontractor, and not necessarily the degree to which the right 
is in fact exercised. Thus, if by virtue of the terms of the I 
"Subcontract Agreement", the general contractor had the right to 
exercise sufficient supervision and control over the Respondent, ] 
then the employees of the Repondent are in the same position as i 
the employees of the general contractor, Christiansen Brothers, 
Inc. Therefore, no distinction can be drawn as between the two I 
positions. Appellants references to provisions for an indepen-
dant contractor by virtue of Section 31-1-42 U.C.A. C1953, as I 
amended) are irrevelent here. j 
i Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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B. THERE ARE NO DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT RELE-
VENT TO THE QUESTIONS NOW BEFORE THE COURT. 
The Appellants have attempted to raise issues of fact 
in the case at Bar which are entirely irrevelent under the law 
of this 3cate. The Appellants clearly admit in Point I of their 
argument that, as articulated by this Court in Adamson, it should 
be kept in mind that the test to be applied in these cases is the 
right +.o supervise and control, and not necessarily the degree to 
around avA attempt to argue issues of fact as to whether or not 
the decedent was an employee of a given contractor or whether the 
contractor was a subcontractor or independant contractor. It is 
clear from the Coirtplaint on file herein, as well as the Brief filed 
by the Appellants, that the Appellants' decedent was an employee of 
the general contractor, Christiansen Brothers, Inc. It is further 
clear from the uncontroverted Affidavit filed by the Respondent 
(R 19-25) that the Respondent was a subcontractor to the employer 
of the Appellants' decedent. 
Given these uncontroverted facts, the remaining deter-
mination that the Court must make is whether the Appellants have 
a cause of action by virtue of the provisions of Section 35-1-62 
U.C.A. (1953, as amended). As discussed in Point I A above, 
Appellants do not have such a cause of action. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING TO 
APPLY SECTION 35-1-63 U.C.A. (1953, AS AMENDED 
IN 1975) RETROSPECTIVELY. 
The Appellants have correctly pointed out that the 
case of Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 205 192 P. 2d 589 (1948) held 
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that: 
Where a statute remedial in nature is amended 
providing a different remedy, all actions pending 
will be covered by the new statutory provision. 
However, the Appellants1 argument that Senate Bill #26, passed 
by the Utah State Legislature in 1975, amending Section 35-1-62 
U.C.A., falls within the purview of Petty is totally non sequitur. 
Quite clearly, we are here concerned with an amendment by the Utah 
Legislature which in fact grants a cause of action which heretofore 
did not exist. Therefore, this is not merely a remedial statute 
which grants a different remedy for an existing cause of action. 
The Appellants alleged in the Complaint a cause of action 
based in tort. It is clear that the rights of the parties are es-
tablished at the time that the alleged tort, from which the liti-
gation erises, occurs. If there is no cause of c^ ction available at 
the time that the accident occurred, one is not created at a later 
date by the adoption of a statute allowing a new cause of action. 
The general rule of construction, as it has been applied 
by the Utah Supreme Court, is that an act effecting substantive 
rights will not be given retroactive effect, unless the act 
clearly requires it. In this case, the statute is silent as to 
whether or not the statute is to be applied retrospectively. 
Representative of the Utah Supreme Court's position, is In Re 
Ingrum's Estate, 106 Utah 337, 148 P. 2d 340 (1944), where the 
Court held that a 1943 law applying to estates was not retroactive 
and stated: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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That this Court is committed to the general 
rule cannot be questioned, for in the case 
of iiereur Gold Mining and Milling v. Spry, 
County Collector, 16 Utah 222/52 Pac. 382, 
3 84, Judge Miner said: * Constitutions as 
well as statutes, should operate prospect-
ively only, unless the words employed show 
a clear intention that they should have a 
retroactive effect. This rule of construc-
tion should always be adhered to, unless 
there be something on the face of the statute 
putting it beyond doubt that the legislature 
meant it to operate retrospectively.1 We 
are convinced that the general rule must 
apply as Section 80-12-7, Laws of Utah 1943, 
is not a procedural enactment, but is sub-
stantive in its effect. 
* * * * * * 
Had the Legislature intended Section 80-12-
. 7, Laws of Utah 1943, to have a retroactive 
effect, it is reasonable to suppose that they 
would have made such a declaration in the 
amendment. 
* * * * * * 
We are forced to the conclusion that the in-
tention of the Legislature is doubtful and 
that Judge Miner's pronouncement of the law, 
above mentioned, is applicable to the situa-
tion before us. 
The Utah Supreme Court's pronouncement on substantive 
law seems adamantly clear and the new amendments to Section 35-1-
62 U.C.A. (1953, as amended) should not be applied retrospectively. 
In determining whether or not this amendment effects substantive 
law, we must consider more thoroughly the Court's decision in the 
case of Petty v. Clark, supra, where the Court, in defining sub-
stantive law, stated: 
Substantive law is defined as the positive 
law which creates, defines and regulates 
the rights and duties of the parties and 
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which may give rise to a cause of action, 
as distincitve from adjective law which 
pertains to and prescribed the practice 
and procedure or the legal machinery by 
which the substantive law is determined or 
made effective. 
Obviously, this amendment effects dramatically the 
substantive law of the rights of injured workmen under the 
Workmen's Compensation Laws of the State of Utah. This amendment 
establishes additional rights and causes of action where none ex-
isted under the prior law of the State. Being substantive in nat-
ure , it therefore cannot be applied retrospectively here. 
POINT III 
^ THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION DOES NOT VIOLATE 
THE APPELLANTS1 FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
GRANTED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA. 
The Appellants have suggested in their Brief that the 
classifications established by Sections 35-1-62 U.C.A. (1953, as 
amended), are unconstitutional. The Appellants argue that there 
is no rational basis upon which such distinction or classification 
can be made and, secondly, that the fundamental right of access 
to the State Court has been denied. 
The guiding principle most often cited by the Courts 
is that the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the 
laws requires that all persons shall be treated alike under like 
circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred 
and the liabilities imposed. 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law, 
Section 488. The rule is well settled that a State may classify 
persons and objects for the purpose of legislation and pass laws 
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applicable only to persons or objects within a designated class* 
A differentiation, however, is not necessarily a discrimination. 
The guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not intend to take 
from the States the right and power to classify the subjects of 
legislation. It does not prohibit or prevent classification, pro-
vided s UCM c1as si fication of persons and things is reasonable for 
the purpose of the legislation, is based on proper and justifiable 
distinctons, considering the purpose of the law7, is not clearly 
arbitrary, and is not a subterfuge to shield one class or unduly 
to burden another or to oppress unlawfully in its administration. 
16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law Section 494. 
One of the basic principles involved in considering 
the validity of legislation assailed under equality provisions of 
the Federal and State Constitutions is that, in the exercise of its 
power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws 
over matters within its jurisdiction, a State is recognized as 
enjoying a wide range of discretion. 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional 
Law Section 495. The authorities state with unanimity that the 
question of classification is primarily for the legislature and 
that it can never become a judicial question except for the pur-
pose of determining, in any given situation, whether the legislative 
action is clearly unreasonable. 16 Am Jr. 2d Constitutional Law 
Section 496. 
The basic constitutionality of the Workmen's Compensation 
laws of the State of Utah has been upheld on several occasions. 
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Park Utah Consol. Mines Company v. Industrial Coram. , 84 U. 481, 
.36 P. 2d 979 (1934); United Air Lines Transport Corp. v. Indus-
trial Cowa., 107 U. 52, 151 P. 2d 591 (1944); Buckingham Trans-
port Company v. Industrial Commission, 93 U. 342, 72 P. 2d 1077 
(1937); and Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 108 U. 1, 156 
P. 2d 835 (1945). 
One need only to return to the reasoning of this Court 
set forth in Adarason v. Oakland Construction Company, supra, to find 
the reasonable and rational basis for the classification of which 
Appellants complain. As the Court said in that case, the pur-
pose of the act is to provide speedy and certain compensation 
for workmen and their dependants and to avoid the delay, expense 
and uncertainty which were involved prior to the act; and the 
concomitant purpose of protecting the employer from the hazards 
of exorbitant and in some instances perhaps ruinous liabilities. 
Correlated with those principles is the proposition that the act 
should be liberally construed and applied to provide coverage and 
effectuate those purposes. Fundamental standards of justice i 
dictate that it would be inconsistant to apply the act liberally 
in favor of the injured workmen in order to find coverage by one 
employer on a project, and then to reverse that policy and adopt 
a restrictive view to exclude coverage of another employer on the | 
same project so that a suit could be maintained against him. i 
Appellants1 contentions are clearly the opposite of this proposi-
tion. 
The reasoning in Adamson clearly establishes the rational 
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and reasonable basis upon which the Section in question is based. 
Subsequent changes in the Section by the Utah State Legislature 
do not in any way reflect a decision that the statute was uncon-
stitutional as it existed prior to the amendment and Appellants 
have cited no authority in support of such proposition. 
The Appellants in this case certainly have not been 
denied the right to access to the State Court. The argument pre-
sented by the Appellants that they have been denied access to the 
State Court when a cause of action was not stated by their Com-
plaint , is obviously unsupportable. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Respondent respectively submits that 
the District Court was correct in holding that the Appellants' Com-
plaint failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could 
be granted under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation laws 
of the State of Utah. The Appellants' decedent was in the same 
employment as the Respondent at the time of the accident and there-
fore the Appellants' sole remedy is compensation under the Workmen's 
Compensation system in this State. Clearly, there are no disputed 
issues of fact relevant to the question presented to the Court in 
this case. 
The Respondent further submits that the District Court 
was correct is refusing to apply Section 35-1-63 U.C.A. (1953, as 
amended in 1975) retrospectively in this case. This amendment by 
the 1975 session of the Utah Legislature clearly was substantive 
in nature and not merely remedial and the amendment itself does 
not provide for retrospective application. 
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Further the District Court's decision in this case does 
not violate the Appellants' Fourteenth Amendment rights guaranteed 
by the Constitution of the United States of America. The classifi-
cation of workers and employers under the Workmen's Compensation 
laws of tho State of Utah are based upon reasonable and rational 
grounds that have consistently withstood constitution attack. 
Therefore, the Respondent respectfully submits that the 
District Court's decision in dismissing Appellants' Complaint 
herein should be affirmed in its entirety. A 
Respectfully submittefl this day of September, 1975. 
l/^Ao^^TTf 
Moffat/ Welling, Eaulsen & Burningham 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
/ 
JUM* c~^a m£*4i John L. Wung 
|fbffat, MellinqfJ Paulsen & Burningham 
^Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
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